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2Abstract
This paper aims to 1) compare financial controls through the main bank system to those of capital markets,
2) analyze the relationship between financial controls through the main bank system and the traditional
Japanese accounting practices, and 3) analyze appropriate changes for financial controls and related accounting
practices. This paper defines a main bank as an investor, which controls the management of a company by
possessing the residual right of control.  This paper shows that a main bank attaches the most importance to
refundable earnings, as a creditor, and firm value, as a stockholder.
This paper argues that it is important to strengthen the power of stockholders in the financial control
system in present day Japan where financial controls through the main bank system no longer functions
effectively.  For this purpose, the most desired reform in the accounting system is the disclosure of future cash
flows and the attribution of accurate stockholder equity amounts.  It is also desired that Japanese management
should make more of an effort to show an accurate and fair reflection of performance and financial position to
stockholders in the market.  This change may lead to increased efficiency of management, and at the same
time, restore the good name of Japanese enterprises that fell in international public’s estimation because of
corruption and window-dressing.
31. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, corruption from off-balance-sheet finance and window-dressing have become
frequent in Japan.  For example, Showa-Shell Oil Co. recorded a loss of 125 billion yen caused by an
unsuccessful forward exchange contract in 1993.  In 1996, Sumitomo Trading Co. recorded a huge loss caused
by the failure of a forward transaction on copper.  Because of the insufficient disclosure system in Japan,
stakeholders could not recognize the risk of these losses.  In 1997, Yamaichi Securities Co., the fourth biggest
security companies in Japan, discontinued its business, as a result of an illegal transaction using an off-balance
sheet associated company.  In this case, even board members of Yamaichi did not know the correct amount of
off-balanced liabilities.  These incidents raised new questions about Japanese-style financial control in relation
to corporate governance through the capital markets and the related Japanese accounting system.
To some extent, the Japanese-style financial control and its related accounting system supported the
Japanese rapid economic growth in 1960s.  Main banks controlled management by the residual right of control
and monitored management in terms of whether or not management retained enough earnings to maintain
production and facilities.  However, the main banks’ role in providing long-term funds has become less and
less important since the mid-1970s (Aoki, M. 1988).  As a result, the corporate governance of main banks over
customers has been in name only.
At present in Japan, it is necessary to strengthen corporate governance through the capital markets, that is,
financial control by stockholders.  Generally speaking, present and potential investors need information on the
value of future net cash inflows of a firm (Busse von Colbe, W., 1957, Copeland, T. et. al., 1994).  However,
the traditional Japanese accounting system and practices works best with main bank monitoring and not that of
stockholders.  The traditional Japanese accounting system and practices neglect to report future cash flows to
stockholders and underestimate stockholders’ equity.  Furthermore, it is difficult for foreign investors to
understand Japanese financial statements because Japanese corporations attach less importance to providing
information to stockholders.
On the other hand, traditional Japanese accounting practices that attach importance to internal accumulated
capital may be useful for the maintenance of on-going enterprises.  This accounting practice may be more
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internationally. These traditional accounting practices are useful for financial oversight by main banks and
supported Japan’s rapid economic growth in the past.
There are many papers which argue for Japanese-style financial control through the main bank system (for
example, see Aoki, M.  and H. Patrick, 1994).  However, the Japanese accounting system, which is related to
the main banks’ monitoring has not been discussed.  This research aims to 1) compare financial oversight
through the main bank system with financial control through capital markets, 2) analyze the relationship
between financial oversight through the main bank system and Japanese traditional accounting practices, and 3)
analyze changes that should be made in the traditional Japanese financial oversight system and related
accounting system changes.
This paper argues that it is important to strengthen the power of stockholders, reform the accounting
system and to instill in management the importance of disclosure of future cash flow and the correct amount of
stockholders equity.
2.  Financial Control through the Main Bank System
Until the late 1970’s, the main bank system was criticized for its backwardness and because it wa thought
to lack a financial control mechanism (Aoki, M. 1989).  According to neoclassic economic theory, when one
regards a firm as a nexus of contracts, it is efficient to have those who have residual rights create a blueprint of
contracts.  As stockholders have a claim to the residuals of a firm, it is reasonable that stockholders control the
decision making to maximize present value of residuals (stock price), not only through a general meeting of
stockholders but through the capital markets.  If the stock price of the firm declines, it is possible that a firm
will be merged and management will be dismissed producing a threat that controls management.  It has been
argued that the Japanese main bank system lacks this threat of dismissal (Aoki, M., 1989).
Since the late 1970s, many papers that focus on the efficiency of the main bank system have been
published.  The effects of the main bank system are discussed as follows (Aoki, M., 1994; Hoshi, T., 1993;
Misumi, K., 1992; Patrick, H., 1994).
51) Monitoring and information productions costs are eliminated due to the monitoring and information
production by a main bank.  Furthermore, the information search cost is reduced.
2) Since the main bank system acts as a substitute for the market, firms do not have to worry about
being merged, and they do not have to pursue short-term earnings which are disclosed in a market
system.  For this reason, an accounting system in which relatively low accounting earnings are
calculated is permitted and an industrial policy is implemented easily.
3) Because of internalization of fund raising, firms continuously provide the main bank with internal
information.  Thus, internalization of fund raising eliminates information asymmetry.  Since external
fund raising costs do not increase, a firm can invest aggressively without thinking of its liquidity and
earning ratios.  In addition, owing to the internalized relationship between a capital provider and a
firm, disclosure costs for a firm decrease and an accounting system that produces relatively lower
earnings is adopted.
These functions are derived from the idea that a main bank is an information producer.  This idea is based
on the economic theory of information that cannot explain the financial control by a main bank.  Later theorists
theorized that the financial control function of a main bank could be explained by the incomplete contract
theory.  This theory refuses an assumption of the agency theory which assumes that we can completely forecast
what will happen in the future.  A main issue of this theory is to whom the residual right of control is to be
given for the purpose of efficiency (Misumi, T., 1992).  According to this theory, financial contracts are to be
classified according to who possesses the residual right of control (Misumi, T., 1992).  In the main bank
system, a main bank is a stockholder, a claimant of the residuals of a firm, as well as a creditor.  Although
management may be insulted from the discipline exercised through the market, it is placed under closer
monitoring from a main bank when it has to rely on borrowing from the bank for financing investment (Aoki,
M., 1988).  Main banks control the business decisions of customers in their own interests in such a manner that,
if the management’s performance is good enough to keep the dividends constant, management keeps the right
control.  If the performance is bad and there is no distribution of the dividends to stockholders, control is
transferred to the main bank.  The right control of intercase is called the residual right of control.  If the
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management will increase, then it is easier for the company to borrow from the bank for financial investment at
lower capital cost.  Thus, the ranking of performance works as an effective incentive for management and in
this manner, the main bank controls management decisions in its own interests (Aoki, M. 1989).
In the period 1966-75, the accumulation of stockholder equity fell short of one-half of the investment in
fixed assets.  New stock issues provided funds covering only about 10 percent of new capital expenditures in
fixed assets (Aoki, M. 1988).  Firms relied deeply on the main banks for financing investment in this era.  In
this period, main banks demonstrated their financial control over customer firms.  Other stockholders delegated
monitoring of firms to the main banks and they followed the main banks’ decision on financing.
Given this information, a main bank can be defined as follows: a main bank is an investor who is delegated
the monitoring of customers by other stockholders and controls management by possessing the residual right of
control.  In sum, the financial control function of a main bank can be characterized as follows:
1) financial control by the main bank system without a market is implemented depending on allocation
of the right of control between a management and a main bank;
2) through the delegated monitoring, a main bank makes decisions on how the right of control should
be allocated for the efficiency purposes.
Thus, a main bank controls management by possessing the residual right of control for efficiency purposes,
whereas stockholders control management by possessing the ownership right.  Then, what kind of data does the
main bank use when it makes decisions?  Is the information the same as the information used by stockholders
or not?
3.  Information for Screening and Monitoring
The monitoring by a main bank can be divided into three stages: ex ante monitoring, interim monitoring
and ex post monitoring.  The ex ante monitoring refers to the investor’s assessment of the credit-worthiness of a
firm itself, investment projects proposed by the firm, and their screening.  The company cannot borrow money
from the main bank, if it cannot pass the screening process of the main bank.  The monitoring in this stage has
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an on-going management behavior and the use of funds in particular after the funds are committed.  The
monitoring at this stage solves problems associated with moral hazard by management.  Ex post monitoring
refers to the verification of performance outcomes of the firm, judgment on the long-run viability of the firm in
case of financial distress, and the use of that information for possible corrective or punitive action.  If investors
make a credible commitment to punish poor management performance, management would have an incentive
to avoid ex ante and interim behavior that might result in poor performance (Aoki, M. 1994). )
 Thus the index used in the three stages of monitoring has the effect of guiding firms.  It is said that in the
third stage of the monitoring, when a firm suffers from a financial distress, the main bank is expected to rescue
the firm.  However, the main bank rescues firms only in certain conditions.  Since the main bank is a claimant
of residual rights, the main bank decides to rescue a firm in financial distress if the value of the residual right of
control of the firm exceeds the liquidation value.  In ddition, other investors who cannot get detailed
information about the firm's performance rely upon the decision whether or not the main bank escues the firm,
because the claim of the main bank for residual right comes to have a value, only after all the other claims
except for a claim of a residual right are satisfied (Misumi, K. 1992).
 Then, what are the performance criteria of the monitors?  Are they same as those used by stockholders in
the capital markets?  The kind of information used to monitor and screen companies is available from bank
manuals (See Appendix).  If a high ranking given by the main bank lowers the cost of capital of a firm, or the
main bank punishes poor management performance, the monitoring criteria could have great effects on
managerial behavior.
According to the manuals, the main bank attaches or should attach the significant importance to the
entrepreneurial spirit of a manager.  This qualitative data can be attained through face to face meetings with
management.  Thus information based on to whom the right of control is allocated cannot necessarily be
acquired from public sources.  Next, various financial ratios, net asset value, refundable earning and an
investment plan, etc. are checked.  Net asset value and refundable earning are especially important for ex ante
monitoring of long-term lending.  As the main bank controls management decisions for its own interest when
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monitoring for long-term lending.  Since the right of control is allocated to management during problem free
on-going behavior of management at interim monitoring, it is better to analyze the criteria for ex ante
monitoring.
According to the manual, the main bank also attaches its primary importance to refundable earning and the
net asset value at the monitoring for the ex ante long-term lending.
(1) Refundable Earning
This index is calculated as follows:
Refundable earning = Before tax profit + Depreciation expenses - Corporate tax-Dividend - Bonus to
board members.
In this equation, before tax profit plus depreciation expenses refers to cash flows.  The before tax profit
minus the corporate tax minus the dividends minus the bonus to board members refers to the accumulated
earning.  This amount can be regarded as funds accumulated internally.  If a firm is to increase the refundable
profit to satisfy a main bank’s monitoring criteria, the firm may increase depreciation expenses.  Furthermore,
the firm can maximize its refundable earning by minimizing corporate tax and dividends.  Since bonuses to
board members is not disclosed in Japan, we cannot investigate this amount and the effect on the refundable
earning.  However, we can investigate depreciation expenses, corporate tax, dividends and their effects on the
refundable earnings in detail.  This paper will now discuss each of these aspects.
1) Depreciation Expense
In the case of depreciation expenses, firms have an incentive to employ the accelerated depreciation
method to increase refundable profit.  This practice accelerates capital accumulation within the firm.  It also
assumes that a firm’s physical capital remains constant.  This method corresponds to the German theory of
business entity and financial capital maintenance (Hax, K. 1957).  The incentive to enterprises to accelerate
depreciation can be supported by research (Tajika, E. et. al., 1996) showing that Japanese enterprises have been
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economic substance, is useful for maintaining physical producing capital at the end of the accounting period,
because the depreciated amount is stored within the firm to replace fixed assets.  The physical capital
maintenance concept requires the adoption of the current cost basis of measurement (IASC, 1989).  Though the
present accounting system maintains nominal financial capital, Japanese enterprises have devised various
means to make the depreciation large enough to maintain or increase the physical capacity of fixed assets.
Since 1977, Japanese enterprises have come to finance almost all of their investments with internal funds.
Furthermore, two-thirds of the internal funds are affected by depreciation (Kunimura, M., 1986).  Thus,
depreciation has played an important role in investments since 1977, and the monitoring criteria by the main
bank may have caused firms to accelerate depreciation.
However, depreciation beyond the economic substance is the point at issue.  If an enterprise is regarded as
belonging to stockholders, then it is not so easy to depreciate beyond the economic substance.  Accelerated
depreciation derives from the idea that the cost of investment by internal funds equals zero.  If profits were
considered as belonging to stockholders, the cost of capital of the invested internal funds would equal the
opportunity cost to stockholders.  If the accumulated funds were distributed to stockholders, the stockholders
might get a certain return by investing the distributed dividends to other assets (Cf. M roi, K., 1994).  Then the
cost of capital of investing internal funds equals the return.  Thus, the idea of capital cost is currently spread
less evenly throughout Japan than during the period of rapid economic growth.
2) Minimization of the Corporate Tax
If a firm minimizes its taxable income, the firm can minimize its cash outflow and maximize the
refundable profit.  The firm can also maximize its firm value, if the firm minimizes its cash outflow.  By
adopting the accelerated method of depreciation, the p-value of the total sum of periodical tax savings becomes
larger.
In Japan, taxable income is determined on the basis of financial accounts as reported to stockholders’.  This
requirement is called the approach of conformity between tax and financial reporting, which aims to secure
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conformity between tax accounting and commercial code accounting.  However, the results work contrary to
reality.  When applying the approach of conformity between tax and financial reporting, accounting methods
for reporting purposes must be made consistent with those for tax purposes.  If firms want to receive special
favors through the tax system, i.e. reduce taxable income, they choose, among the alternative accounting
methods, the one which makes the largest deductions for tax purposes.  Furthermore, they must follow this
selected accounting method for tax purposes as well.
One good example of firm behavior is shown in the choice of depreciation methods.  More than 90 percent
of Japanese firms used the accelerated method in 1985, where as more than 70 percent of the US firms used the
straight line method (Banba, K. 1986, Shohet, J. et. al., 1987).
This behavior of Japanese firms mentioned above leads to a lower accounting profit as well as a lower
calculation of stockholders’ equity, as shown in Okada (1989).  To examine the effect of the different
depreciation methods selected on earnings or net worth ratio, Okada assumed that firms in the USA and UK
select alternatives conforming to the approach of conformity between tax and financial reporting.  Based on this
assumption, adjustments to the net worth ratio was made for sample firms in the USA and UK.  From these
adjustments, it was found that the net worth ratios of the sample firms in the USA and UK decreased.  As for
the USA, the decrease was statistically significant.  After the adjustment, the net worth ratio of the US firms
decreased from 40.01% to 32.93%, where the ratio of Japanese firms was 33.90%.  This means that the net
worth ratios of Japanese firms are underestimated relative to those of USA.
3) Dividend and Capital Accumulation
There are many differences in accounting standards among countries, but the diversity is thought to result
from deviation in emphasis on fundamental accounting concepts in these countries.  When attention is focused
on these fundamental concepts, we can safely attribute the cause of accounting standard differences to the
degree of emphasis on the accrual of expenses.
Under accrual accounting, the effects of transactions and other events are recognized when they occur and
not as payments are received or made and the transactions are recorded in the accounting records and reported
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in the financial statements for the periods to which they relate.  Financial statements prepared on the accrual
basis inform users not only of past transactions involving payments and receipts but also of obligations to make
payments in the future and resources to be received in the future (IASC, 1989).  When the emphasis is on
accruals, it is reasonable to keep an eye on assets.  The country that has the most rigorous rules for assets is
Germany, where the concept of an asset is derived from proprietary rights in civil law.  Therefore, the
possibility of capitalization depends on whether the item can be interpreted logically according to the theory of
property.  That is capitalization of expenses that, effect payment or the confirmation of obligation of payment
in the future is extremely limited.  As a result, the amount of equity capital in Germany is understated.
Japan has a similar foundation with respect to fundamental accounting concepts.  In Japa , deferred assets
on the balance sheets are limited by commercial code to eight items.  (This is based on modern accounting
theory investors' interests must be protected in the first hand and future benefits are to be capitalized.)  Some
deferred assets are accompanied by a limitation of payments of dividends because they originally cannot be
capitalized.  The limitation of payment of dividends is one of the policies for maintaining capital and protecting
creditors. This limitation is a legal measure to protect creditors by preventing a firm's distribution of dividends
to stockholders based on assets that cannot be converted to cash.
Even if capitalization of such expenses is permitted, firms with good performance tend not to capitalize the
expenses due to the requirement of conformity between reporting and taxable income.  Under this requirement,
if a firm wants to minimize taxable income and selects a method which makes expenses larger, the firm must
select the same accounting method when it calculates taxable income.  Since firms want to minimize cash
outflow and maximize their value firms tend to minimize taxable income when other things are equal.  This
tendency is convenient for both main bank monitoring, which puts importance on law-based stability, and for
capital accumulation within a firm (Okada, 1993).
The USA and UK are two countries with very different accounting concepts from those of Germany and
Japan.  In the USA, assets are defined as probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a
particular entity as a result of past transactions or events (FASB, 1985).  The future economic benefits
embodied in an asset mean the potential to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the flow of cash and cash
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equivalents to the enterprise (IASC, 1989).  The common characteristic possessed by all assets is “service
potential” or “future economic benefit,” the scarce capacity to provide services or benefits to the entities that
use them (FASB, 1985).
According to this definition, one must capitalize costs when cash or cash equivalents flow into an
enterprise with a high possibility of future benefit, whereas costs must not be capitalized when cash or cash
equivalents do not flow into the enterprise with a high possibility of future benefit.  Thus, the concept of an
asset is derived from the concept of future cash flow.  In the USA and UK, the amount of equity capital is not
understated as it is in Japan and Germany.  It is thought that the amount of equity capital represents the
stockholder’s value as fairly as possible.
(2) Net Asset Value
Analyses of net asset value are especially important for the monitoring of mid- and long-term lending.
Analysis of the net asset value means analysis of the firm value.  According to the manual, a main bank
calculates firm value as follows:
Net asset value = Value of assets - Nominal value of liabilities-----(1)
In the above equation, only assets which are associated with business operation are included in the
equation measured by current costs.  At present, in the USA, firm value is regarded as the most important index
of management performance.  In the USA, firm value is calculated by discounting cash flows:
Value =Value of operations - Value of liabilities------ (2)
The value of operations equals the discounted value of expected future free cash flows.  Free cash flows
are equal to the after-tax operating earnings of the company, plus non-cash charges such as depreciation, less
investments in operating working capital, property, plant and equipment, and other assets (Copeland, T. et. al.,
1994).  In the above equation, the value of liabilities equals the present value of the cash flows to the debt
holders, discounted at a rate that reflects the risk of that flow.
According to Copeland, T. et. al., increasing stockholder value does not conflict with the long-run interests
of other stakeholders, because stockholders are the only stakeholders of a corporation who simultaneously
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maximize everyone’s claim by seeking to maximize their own.  Stockholders are claimants to the residual
assets of the firm after deducting all its liabilities.
The firm value is originally the sales price of the firm in the market (Muenstermann, 1939).  According to
Copeland, T, et. al., the empirical evidence shows that firm value calculated according to Equation 2 is most
closely related to the movement of share price (Copeland, et. al, 1994).  Firm value calculated according to
Equation 1 is only an approximate value compared to the value calculated by Equation 2.
 4.  Summary
In summary, this paper looks at the financial control mechanism of the main bank system and the main
index it uses for monitoring mid-and long-term finance. This paper points out that the main bank possesses the
residual right of control over management, and attaches considerable importance to the refundable earnings and
the firm’s value as determined by the monitoring of mid-and long-term finance.
It is interesting that the main bank uses indices similar to those used by USA investors to determine the
importance of a firm’s value, though the value calculated by the main bank does not take cash flow and present
value of liabilities into account.  This evidence shows that, as Aoki, M. pointed out, a main bank is both a
stockholder and a creditor (Aoki, M., 1987).  As a stockholder, the main bank attaches importance to indices
such as the firm value.  As a creditor, the main bank attaches importance to refundable earnings.
The ratio of stocks held by banks was 40.1 percent in 1990, as compared to 23.1 percent in 1960 and 23.4
percent in 1965.  The main bank system reached its pinnacle in the 1960s and it was during this period, that it
functioned most appropriately. During the 1960s, the main bank controlled a firm’s management not through
the possession of ownership rights, but of the residual right of control.
In present day Japan, empirical evidence indicates that firms that have a high ratio of stocks held by
foreigners, board members and banks have a better performance than those for which a high ratio of stock is
held by Japanese corporations and individuals (Yonezawa, Y., et al., 1996).  Considering that foreigners control
management according to neoclassic economic theory, this evidence shows that Japanese banks now control
management by holding equity interest in firms, not by holding the residual right of control.
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Individual investors are not mature in Japan, as the evidence shows.  This is partly because the Japanese
accounting system does not present the inflow of future economic benefits and outflow from the enterprise of
resources embodying economic benefits (Cf. IASC, 1989).  Earnings and stockholders’ equity are understated
under the present accounting system.  It is important to strengthen the power of stockholders to restore
efficiency to the management of firms in Japan.  For this purpose, it is desirable to reform the accounting
system to take into account the future cash flows and the correct amount of stockholder equity.  Furthermore,
Japanese firms should make efforts to disclose true and fair appraisals of their performance and financial
position to stockholders and the market.  This may also be an effective way for Japanese firms to restore their
good name in the international economy.
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